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Tales of Function and Form: The Discursive Legitimation of 
International Technocracy 
 
 
by Jens Steffek 
 
Abstract 
It has become commonplace to say that, in the past, international governance has 
been legitimated mainly, if not exclusively, by its welfare-enhancing ‘output’. There 
has been very little research, however, on the history of legitimating international 
governance by its output to validate this point. In this essay I begin to address this 
gap by inquiring into the origins of output-oriented strategies for legitimating 
international organizations. Scrutinizing the programmatic literature on international 
organizations from the  early 20
th  century, I illustrate how a new and distinctive 
account of technocratic legitimation emerged and in the 1920s separated from other 
types of liberal internationalism. My inquiry, centring on the works of James Arthur 
Salter, David Mitrany, Paul S. Reinsch and Pitman B. Potter, explores their 
respective conceptions of ‘good functional governance’, executed by a non-political 
international technocracy. Their account is explicitly pitched against a notion of 
‘international politics’, perceived as violent, polarizing, and irrational. The emergence 
of such a technocratic legitimation of international governance, I submit, needs to be 
seen in the context of societal modernization and bureaucratization that unfolded in 
the first half of the 20
th century. I also highlight how in this account the material output 
of governance is intimately linked to the virtues of the organizational form that brings 
it about. 
 
 
   3 
Introduction
1
For almost two decades, there has been a lively debate in the discipline of 
International Relations over the legitimacy of international governance. Most 
contributions to that debate focus on the much-lamented ‘democratic deficit’ of 
governance beyond the state, and the corresponding notion of an ‘input legitimacy’ 
that is obtained through procedures of political representation and consultation. 
Considerably less attention is paid to the output side of governance. Output-oriented 
strategies of political legitimation stress the potential of systems of governance to 
produce decisions that enhance the welfare of the entire constituency in question 
(Scharpf 1970: 21-24). Reference to the output dimension is supposed to be a 
complement, and even an alternative, to input-oriented forms of legitimation of 
governance beyond the state (Scharpf 1999: 11). And it is often argued that, before 
the ‘democratic deficit’ was diagnosed in the 1990s, international governance (or 
international organization/cooperation/integration) was legitimated mainly, if not 
exclusively, by reference to its output (e.g. Zürn 2004).  
 
 
That output-oriented modes of legitimation have always been extremely important in 
the international domain is a plausible conjecture. However, we know very little about 
the form and content of such legitimation discourses in the past. This is unfortunate 
because we do have a rich body of published material at hand that in the first half of 
the 20
th century made the case for a type of international cooperation that one would 
call ‘output-oriented’, even if that term was not in use at the time. In this essay I 
therefore endeavour to trace the emergence and transformation of this type of 
                                                 
1  Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Gemeinsame Sektionstagung Politische Theorie und 
Internationale Beziehungen der DVPW, Goethe-Universität Frankfurt/Main, 10-12 June 2010; at the workshop 
„The Politics of Talk in International Relations“ at the University of Bremen, 27/28 July 2010; at the 7th Pan-
European International Relations Conference, Stockholm, 9-11  September 2010; and at the Department of 
History and Area Studies of Aarhus University, 12 November 2010. I wish to thank participants for their helpful 
comments, in particular Andreas Føllesdal, Daniel Gaus and Maja Zehfuss who acted as discussants.   4 
justificatory discourse. This is a relevant topic for scientific research in IR because, 
first of all, the output of international governance is not something to be found simply 
‘out there’, striking our senses. Rather, the output of governance is always 
constructed discursively and embedded in wider structures of meaning and 
interpretation that establish a link between the activities of a largely invisible 
international organization based in Brussels, Geneva, or Washington D.C. and 
perceivable change in the material world. As a consequence, the output of 
international organizations can become a social mechanism of legitimation only 
through processes of discursive representation. To function as legitimating devices, 
references to organizational output need to be presented as convincing lines of 
argument, or even as a form of narrative, woven into a story.  
 
It is plausible to assume that narratives containing output-oriented arguments 
justifying international governance may have been changing over time. During the 
1940s and 1950s, the most often cited rationale for international governance, or 
rather ‘international organization’, was that international cooperation and  regional 
integration would lead to peace (Mitrany 1943). In today’s global governance 
discourse, by contrast, the peace-as-output argument has receded to the 
background, and a notion of effective problem-solving-as-output seems to have taken 
its place. On the other hand, some features do not seem to have changed much over 
time, in particular the recurring reference to an objective need for international 
cooperation that arises from increasing international interdependence (compare 
Reinsch 1911 to Keohane 1984). 
 
Even if much of today’s evaluative discourse on global and European governance is 
focussing on the input dimension of legitimacy, output-oriented lines of argument can   5 
still be found. Influential commentators, such as Giandomenico Majone (1998) and 
Andrew Moravcsik (2002), defend functional governance by international 
administrative agencies with limited scope of competences. Legal scholars have 
developed the notion of a good inter- or supranational administration (Esty 2006), 
and the concomitant conception of global administrative law (Kingsbury et al. 2005). 
Authors who stress the output legitimacy of international governance also seem to be 
sympathetic to a specific vision of international governance that one would best 
characterize as a form of expert administration working on functionally limited 
technical tasks in independent organizations that are removed from the dynamics of 
party politics. This is a first indication that two major themes, the welfare-enhancing 
output of governance and the organizational form that brings it about, may be 
intimately linked. 
 
My task in this essay is to explore the very origins of this vision. I focus on a body of 
programmatic thought that is often referred to in IR as ‘functionalism’ and that 
justified international organization by pointing out its welfare-enhancing output. 
Despite the occasional reference to David Mitrany’s seminal work, and despite the 
efforts by a number of dedicated scholars to highlight its continuing relevance 
(Ashworth and Long, 1999), functionalism is a largely forgotten approach to 
international relations. This is unfortunate, because functionalism was not merely, 
and maybe not even in the first place, an academic theory of international relations 
but an empirically influential way of legitimating the power of technical international 
organizations (Sewell 1966: 47). Functionalism, as Inis Claude had it, was ‘not 
merely a recipe to be studied, but also a pudding to be tasted’ (Claude 1964: 365). 
Some have called functionalism an ‘ideology’ (Tooze 1977: 211), and I take it to be a 
strategy of legitimating existing or planned international institutions. Consequently, I   6 
will analyze it here as a legitimating account of international organization, not as an 
academic theory of international relations (which has been done extensively, see 
Engle 1957, Haas 2008[1964], Sewell 1966).  
 
The text is structured as follows: In the next section I lay some theoretical 
foundations for the analysis that follows. I briefly explain my conception of 
legitimatory discourse and discursive legitimation, underlining the important role of 
elite communication in the development of new legitimating accounts. In the third 
section I take issue with the origins of the line of argument for international 
technocracy that has become widely known as ‘functionalist’. I argue that Mitrany 
was certainly a highly original thinker but neither the first nor the only one to call for 
international organization(s) along functional lines. In the fourth section I turn to the 
writings of four authors who can be regarded as early advocates of international 
technocracy: James Arthur Salter, David Mitrany, Paul S. Reinsch and Pitman B. 
Potter. The fifth section is devoted to the similarities and differences of their 
respective accounts, and section 6 briefly concludes. 
 
The upshot of the discussion is that there is sizeable overlap among the 
programmatic visions of transnational technocracy as developed by Salter, Mitrany, 
Reinsch and Potter. I submit that the emergence of a ‘functional’ legitimation of 
international organizations cannot be understood without reference to the context of 
societal modernization and faith in rational political planning in which it was 
developed. References to welfare gains as ‘output’ of governance were always 
present but they represented just one aspect of a more complex legitimating account 
that focuses on the virtues of non-political, functional governance by international 
technocracy. The form of governance matters as much as its output. Interestingly,   7 
early accounts of ‘good functional governance’ on a global scale resound with 
themes from Max Weber’s theory of societal modernization through bureaucratization 
and the rule of law, which was developed during the same period of time.  
 
2) Discursive legitimation and legitimating accounts 
Legitimacy has become a buzzword in the recent literature on international 
governance, but it is not always clear whether the term is used in the normative or in 
the empirical-analytical sense. What I am proposing here is an empirically oriented 
approach to the study of legitimacy and legitimation. Legitimacy in the empirical 
sense is the phenomenon that specific institutions in power, or even an entire social 
order, enjoy ‘the prestige of being considered binding’ (Weber 1978: 31). A discourse 
approach to the study of legitimacy refers to the key social mechanism by which 
legitimation functions, which is public justification and challenge (Steffek 2003). I am 
studying the use of arguments, factual and normative ones, which are brought 
forward in support of certain governance arrangements. Legitimacy ‘is built over time 
by the discursive, critical examination of institutions and their actions’ (Parkinson 
2003: 184). This is not to suggest that all challenges to, and affirmations of, 
legitimacy are discursive in nature. Persons and institutions in power may also use 
symbolic techniques to legitimate their roles (Barker 2001), and challengers of the 
status quo have repertoires of contention that contain also non-discursive, symbolic 
acts of protest (Haunss 2007). Symbolic acts, however, in the modern age seem to 
be rather subsidiary to the discursive type of legitimation. Protesters normally employ 
symbolic techniques in order to draw attention to an explicit and verbalized political 
message. 
   8 
The ensemble of connected speech acts that are used to legitimate or (de-)legitimate 
societal and political institutions may be called an ‘account’. The concept of an 
‘account’ was developed in sociology and originally referred to the explanation and 
justification of deviant or unexpected behaviour by individuals. Citing Scott and 
Lyman one may define an account as ‘a linguistic device employed whenever an 
action is subjected to valuative inquiry’ (Scott and Lyman 1968: 46). The concept 
may be also used, and without stretching it too far, to denote the practice of 
explaining and justifying novel, and in that sense ‘deviant’, proposals for political 
institutions. In legitimating accounts we find what Mills called ‘vocabularies of 
motives’, that is, ‘accepted justifications for present, future, or past programs or acts’ 
(Mills 1940: 907). Motives, in Mill’s sense, are not simply individual reasons for 
action. Rather, motives are widely shared justifications for action that individuals cite 
routinely and that are routinely accepted by their peers. Deviations from established 
ways of justifying actions are in need of explanation and give rise to what Mills called 
‘motive talk’, the discursive screening of the validity of motives.  
 
Why do we need the term ‘legitimating account’ here? Why not just talk in a more 
conventional fashion about theories of institutional legitimacy? The reason is, first of 
all, that it would be overbearing to suggest that normative ‘political theories’ in the 
academic sense have ever legitimated a system of government. Rather, elements of 
those theories, such as axioms and principles, have become incorporated into the 
accounts that political actors give to sustain or challenge political legitimacy. What 
also distinguishes account-giving from theorizing is that on closer inspection most 
historically existing accounts of political legitimacy are not limited to logical inference 
from a general premise or principle but also contain descriptive and narrative 
elements. These elements may be references to an imagined common origin or   9 
certain historical events that can function as founding myths of societies and states 
(Anderson 1983, Cederman 2001, Obradovic 1996). I suppose that also the 
legitimating accounts of international organizations are likely to rest on such 
amalgams of relatively heterogeneous elements. 
 
Legitimating accounts are produced, propagated and transformed by elites, 
consisting of politicians, journalists, intellectuals etc. They become fully effective only 
when they successfully spread through the public sphere, gaining access to a wider 
audience. Studying elite discourse on the merits and faults of governance 
arrangements is a way of observing the production of legitimating accounts. Studying 
mediated public discourse, by contrast, would be a way of observing the spread of 
these legitimating accounts to a wider audience (Schneider et al. 2010). The analysis 
of elite discourse hence is a necessary element of studying political legitimation at 
work but certainly only one strategy, next to studying media discourse, opinion polls, 
or individual belief systems through extensive interviewing or focus groups. The 
problem with studying legitimation at the citizen end is, however, that we do not have 
appropriate survey data to explore popular perceptions of international governance of 
the distant past. The question if, or to what extent, citizens were ever convinced of 
the beneficial output of international governance is extremely hard to answer in 
retrospect. I am conscious that this study, based on written sources of elite 
communication is only concerned with parts of a much larger puzzle. However, it 
covers new ground by analyzing the emergence of legitimating account(s) of 
‘functional governance’ in the first decades of the 20
th century. 
 
   10 
3) The historical context: programmatic internationalism in the early 20
th 
century 
Historically, programmatic proposals for functional governance by a transnational 
technocracy became prominent during the Interwar years. The very idea of 
international cooperation in technical and scientific matters is older, and a Frenchman 
writing under the pseudonym of Edgar Saveney seems to have been the first one to 
call for European integration along these lines in 1870 (quoted in Engle 1957: 8). And 
also empirical instances of what later came to be called functional governance 
existed on a transnational scale well before (Murphy 1994). The ‘public international 
unions’ of the 19
th century may count as the first instances of functional cooperation 
among states in a multilateral and technocratic fashion (Reinsch 1911; Sayre 1919). 
However, truly programmatic proposals for international technocracy can be found in 
what is commonly referred to as the ‘idealist’ writings of the early 20
th century.  
 
The term ‘idealism’ in this context denotes a strand of thinking about eliminating war 
through international cooperation, the rule of law, economic interdependence, 
education, the promotion of democracy etc. (Wilson 1995a). ‘Idealism’ is a 
problematic label, however, because it was a charge made by political opponents 
rather than a neutral description by disinterested observers. Some great post-war 
‘realists’ in international relations thinking, such as E.H. Carr, Hedley Bull, John Herz 
and Hans Morgenthau, were influential in portraying the ‘idealism’ of the early 20
th 
century as some sort of temporary folly that does not warrant much scholarly 
attention any more. Idealism’s main influence, or so the story goes, was in setting 
proper realist thinking and systematic IR-theorizing on track when its utopias 
foundered in the apocalypse of World War II. This essay is not the place to set the 
record straight and discuss the importance of ‘idealism’ in the evolution of IR theory,   11 
and others have done so ably (Osiander 1998, Wilson 1998). My interest here is in 
the discursive legitimation of international governance, and in that respect there are 
very good reasons for studying idealist writings.  
 
Idealist authors in their time not just made original proposals but had public influence 
in a way that contemporary IR scholars do not. They directly delivered argumentative 
raw material for academics and politicians alike, and they sought public impact and 
political influence. They actively tried to establish a discursive legitimation for their 
new visions of international governance. Most of the idealists were not academics in 
today’s sense, even if many held academic positions, but they were public 
intellectuals. The arguably most popular work of the idealist kind, Norman Angell’s 
“Great Illusion” (Angell, 1910), sold over two million copies between 1910 and 1913, 
and was translated into 25 languages (Weinroth, 1974: 551). One measure that most 
idealists agreed upon was the need for international organization in the singular, and 
of international organizations in the plural, on the road to world peace. International 
organization in the singular would include aspects such as the international rule of 
law and the peaceful settlement of disputes. International organizations in the plural 
included forums of global cooperation and diplomacy such as the League of Nations, 
and functional organizations (the ‘public unions’) with rather narrow, technical 
mandates, such as the Universal Postal Union (UPU) or the International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU). It is the latter type of proposal that is of particular 
interest in this paper.  
 
The programmatic proposal of setting up an international technocracy divided into 
functional agencies is most commonly attributed to David Mitrany. There is a good 
deal of truth in this, as Mitrany was the first one to publish a book-length treatise on   12 
the subject (Mitrany 1933), and he continued working and publishing on functional 
integration of Europe and the world until his death in 1975. Consequently, Mitrany’s 
seminal work will occupy a prominent place in this analysis of the emergence of the 
functionalist legitimation of international technocracy. But, as I will discuss below, 
many of his ideas were shared and propagated by some of his contemporaries as 
well (Dubin 1983). In this essay I will therefore broaden the range of my inquiry and 
take into account the writings of three other key authors. First of all, I will scrutinize 
the work of James Arthur Salter, a British diplomat, high official of the League of 
Nations,  and Oxford professor. In his book ‘Allied Shipping Control’, published in 
1921, Salter delivered an important blueprint of a functional international 
administration, based on his wartime experience. Second, I will turn to the writings of 
Paul S. Reinsch and Pitman B. Potter, the only Americans among the ranks of classic 
IR functionalists.
2
 
 Reinsch was a political scientist and diplomat who delivered the 
first systematic study on the functioning of international functional organizations. 
Pitman B. Potter was a political scientist who in 1932 moved from the University of 
Wisconsin, where also Reinsch had been teaching, to the newly founded Graduate 
Institute of International Studies in Geneva, the gathering ground of progressive 
students of international organization. Reinsch’s and Potter’s work is instructive for 
comparative purposes because they developed their ideas outside the specific 
intellectual milieu from which most of the British idealists emerged.  
The central questions to be addressed in comparing  the legitimating accounts 
presented by these four authors are as follows: Is it possible to identify a common 
                                                 
2 The authors usually regarded as classical functionalists are presented in Haas 2008[1964], 29. The most 
obvious candidate not considered in this essay is Leonard Woolf whose wartime book ‘International 
Government’ (Woolf 1916) delivered what Peter Wilson called the ‘skeleton of a functional theory’ (Wilson 
1995b: 140), but was rather unspecific on precisely those institutional and organizational questions that are in the 
focus of this contribution.   13 
legitimating account for international governance of the functional kind in Britain and 
America? If so, what are its central characteristics? What role does the material 
output of governance play in these legitimating accounts, and what role the specific 
style of governance? 
 
4) From wartime cooperation to a “working peace system” 
a) British functionalism 
The end of the First World War gave a boost to world order proposals and to the 
foundation of international organizations (Kennedy 1987). The war was evidence that 
the enormous technological advances of the time were not used for the progress of 
mankind but rather for mindless destruction. Traumatic experiences on the battlefield 
made prominent idealists, such as the Welsh industrialist and benefactor David 
Davies, dedicate their energy and fortune to the quest for world peace. Personal 
trauma is certainly an extremely important connection between the Great War and 
the rise of idealism in the international relations thinking of the 1920s. Yet, with 
regard to the construction of the functional legitimation of international governance 
the wartime experience proved important in two additional ways.  
 
The first link is in the boost to modernization that World War I had brought about. The 
enormous effort of the war required from participant states the mobilization of 
resources and coordination of economic activity on an unprecedented scale. Mitrany 
in a study on the Balkans in fact identified the war as a great modernizer and 
centralizer of economic governance (Mitrany 1936). Public planning became 
indispensable in this situation. Second, the war also prompted cooperation among 
the Western allies, which proved to be a laboratory of international functional 
cooperation. The Allied Maritime Transport Council (AMTC), albeit a short-lived   14 
experiment, seems to have provided a crucial experience of international 
administration in practice. The task of this wartime organization was to coordinate 
shipping activities among the Western allies. A number of prominent figures served 
on it, such as Jean Monnet for France and James Arthur Salter for the United 
Kingdom. For Monnet it was an important experience of international integration 
(Monnet 1976: 71-95) and a personal friendship with Salter developed (Salter 1961: 
176-7).  
 
It is in the last section of Salter’s book on the AMTC, published in 1921, that we find a 
first programmatic sketch of functional international organization, and a characteristic 
array of themes and arguments in favour of it. Unlike David Mitrany whose name still 
is somewhat prominent in IR theory books, James Arthur Salter needs some brief 
introduction. Salter (1881-1975) was a British diplomat, politician and academic. After 
graduating from Oxford University, Salter joined the British civil service in 1904. 
During the war he became a member of the Chartering Committee of the AMTC and 
in the 1920s worked as head of the economic and financial section of the League of 
Nations Secretariat in Geneva. In 1934 Salter was appointed Gladstone professor of 
political theory and institutions at Oxford University and between 1930 and 1953 was 
involved, in various functions, in British politics. He was a prolific writer on British and 
international affairs, and political economy. 
 
In Part V of his seminal book on the AMTC, Salter analyzes the conditions under 
which functional cooperation among the Western allies came about. He finds that, 
first of all, the particular sense of urgent need for cooperation helped overcome the 
usually slow and cumbersome ways of international diplomacy. The German 
submarine war had made shipping capacities scarce and incentivized effective   15 
transnational administration of these capacities. However, Salter also perceives 
some crucial differences between the military and the economic sphere (and shipping 
control was at the intersection of the two). The military sphere requires clear 
hierarchy and efficient command and control structures. In the economic sphere, he 
contends, there is neither a need nor a possibility for such hierarchy (Salter 1921: 
248). As a consequence, the transnational machinery set in motion by the allies had 
the task of controlling and coordinating shipping capacities but without supreme 
control that would have replaced national government. ‘Above all, the Allied 
organization solved the problem of controlling the action, without displacing the 
authority, of National governments’ (Salter 1921: 246). 
 
In structural and organizational terms, the AMTC was an interesting hybrid between 
an advisory and executive body. In the Council, member states were not represented 
by diplomats of their foreign service but by the national ministers and the lower level 
officials directly responsible for shipping matters. By this construction, the 
agreements from the Council were implemented directly through the national 
ministries, an arrangement that ‘practically destroyed the distinction between the 
advisory and the executive’ (Salter 1921: 249). The reason why this specific 
organizational form was chosen, Salter explains, was that career diplomats of the 
foreign service were ill-equipped to deal with the complexity of the tasks at hand. As 
generalists, diplomats did not have the specific expertise necessary for tackling 
highly technical problems. The same was true for ministers who attended 
international meetings for a day or two, and prepared for these intergovernmental 
meetings nationally, with their domestic experts and officials. The solution to this 
problem of territorial fragmentation, and for Salter the true innovation of the AMTC, 
was a transnational standing group of experts who would continually and jointly work   16 
on the solution of the complex problem. Salter calls it the ‘principle of direct contact 
between specialists’ (Salter 1921: 253). In the AMTC, these specialists were 
organized in some twenty committees, each discussing one specific aspect related to 
allied shipping and supply.  
 
Salter then extrapolated from this historical experience and argued that such a 
method of direct contact between specialists would be adaptable to a huge number 
of different functional needs of cooperation, within and beyond the state. Salter was 
convinced that the complexity of modern life made it necessary to strengthen the role 
of the executive and public administration, and especially of expert committees at 
work in the domestic and international sphere. These expert committees he finds 
necessary to deal with the increasing complexity of politics under conditions of 
modernity, and their existence shifted the balance between politicians and 
bureaucrats. ‘In the growing complexity of modern life, administration steadily 
becomes more and more important in comparison with legislation in the government 
of a country’ (Salter 1921: 260). The ideal of public administration present in Salter’s 
work is that of ‘an impersonal science based upon the conclusions of gathered and 
winnowed experience’ (ibid.). Salter strongly believed in the virtues of public 
administration that are likely to materialize whenever civil servants were given 
constructive and ‘obviously useful’ tasks (Salter 1933: 214).  
 
Salter does not envisage functional organizations with supranational powers that 
would gradually disempower their member states. Yet, we can find some scepticism 
towards the nation-state in his work. He found an unhealthy, exaggerated 
concentration of political power in national governments. This, he suggested, led to 
conflict because under the conditions of international interdependence there was a   17 
great deal of minor, marginal conflict among states that endangered peace. He 
asserts that the League of Nations was able to mitigate this exaggerated 
concentration of power in a few national capitals. ‘[T]he institution of the League, with 
its principles of publicity and open diplomacy, is an attempt to take public policy away 
from the few overstrained centres of excessive power, and to base it boldly and 
broadly on the general wishes and will of the peoples of the world. (…) It replaces 
centralization by co-ordination’ (Salter 1921: 255). The excessive power of the state, 
he argued, did not serve the needs of the people well. 
 
Interestingly, Salter also contends that cooperation among specialists in particular 
policy fields would delegitimate the diplomatic practice of political horse-trading and 
shift the negotiation mode, as we would say today, from ‘bargaining’ to ‘arguing’ 
(Elster 1986, Risse 2000). Questions would become discussed ‘on their merits’ rather 
than in the framework of a quid pro quo. ‘And behind this slowly and painfully new 
idea  -which may ultimately prove the hope of the world-  begins to form and find 
expression, the idea that even a particular negotiation should not be of the nature of 
a bargain; that there is for most questions somewhere a just solution independent of 
the relative strength of the contending parties, and that the question should be settled 
on these its intrinsic merits’ (Salter 1921: 257). For Salter, experts are much better 
equipped than diplomats to decide questions on their merits. The networks of 
national specialists that Salter envisages should be in continuous contact so as to 
develop trust in each other. They should ‘discuss policy frankly in its earlier stages 
and before it has been formed and formulated in their respective countries’ (Salter 
1921: 258). Thus specialists find a solution before national politicians are even able 
to define and pronounce a national interest on the matter.  
   18 
In the discussion about the design of the League of Nations and its activities, Salter 
sees the proper role of the organization not in performing great power mediation but 
in the more humble tasks. The League, he argues, should not put its emphasis on 
the arbitration of interstate conflicts that have already arisen, but rather on tackling 
the root causes of international friction. To that end, the League should provide 
administrative machinery to promote progress. This machinery shall help 
governments not simply to adjust but to formulate their public policies. What Salter 
had in mind was not a supranational authority like the Commission of the European 
Union, but transgovernmental networks of specialists, of the kind that Slaughter 
describes in her “New World Order” (Slaughter 2004), and he proposed that the 
League of Nations Secretariat be organized accordingly (Dubin 1983: 473-75). In 
summary, we can identify some building blocks of what one may call a ‘functional 
legitimation’ in Salter’s account: a focus on problem-solving as task of international 
governance; the creation of functionally designed international organizations; the 
paramount role of administrators and experts; the possibility, and absolute necessity, 
of centralized planning. 
 
As stated in the beginning, David Mitrany (1888-1975) certainly has been the most 
influential and systematic thinker on functional international organizations and 
transnational technocracy. He was influenced by a British intellectual environment 
which was as ‘liberal’ as it was ‘left-wing’, and that one may call most appropriately 
‘Fabian’. In fact, in Mitrany’s case there is an intimate connection between the 
emergence of functionalist world order proposals and the social question, which 
requires a brief exposition and some biographical notes. Many scholars have been 
interested in the origins of Mitrany’s functionalist ideas that seem to have appeared 
so suddenly on the scene in the Interwar years. The author himself sustained that he   19 
picked them up along the way, drawing lessons from experience (Mitrany 1975). It is 
documented, however, that Mitrany was heavily influenced by his teachers at the 
London School of Economics where he enrolled in 1912, L.T.Hobhouse and Graham 
Wallas (Ashworth 2005: 208). Hobhouse was politically liberal (as Mitrany himself) 
and Wallas a socialist, but both had a keen interest in the social question, even if 
they favoured different solutions. In addition, he was influenced by the thought of 
other theorists in the ambit of the British Labour Party and the Fabian Society, such 
as G.D.H. Cole, Harold Laski, and Leonard Woolf (Navari 1995).  
 
Mitrany himself was concerned about the fate of the impoverished peasants of his 
native Romania and he continued working on the subject of rural poverty until the 
1950s (Mitrany 1930, 1951). It is interesting to see that the same combination of a 
call for social reform at home and re-organization of politics abroad can be found in 
the work of his fellow British internationalists Norman Angell and Leonard Woolf. It is 
probably not an exaggeration to say that, in Britain, the ‘idealist’ concern with 
international political questions often resulted from, or at least stood in a synergetic 
relationship with, an interest in problems of social welfare and the modernization of 
societies. The British idealists, and prominently among them the functionalist authors, 
viewed issues of international politics from the perspective of the individual and its 
needs. 
 
Unlike many other idealist writers of the Interwar years, Mitrany remained utterly 
sceptical of grand institutional schemes, such as global systems of collective security 
or international armed forces (Davies 1930). He was particularly troubled by the 
problem of sanctioning. He realized that sanctioning breaches of international law 
would place an enormous burden on countries, especially the smaller ones, or those   20 
with long borders with a boycotted state (Mitrany 1925). As an alternative to collective 
security he envisaged schemes of functional cooperation at the administrative level. 
Mitrany was certainly familiar with Salter’s book on the AMTC that he mentioned in 
his memoir (1975: 17). In 1922 he had taken up a job in London as assistant 
European editor of the Carnegie Endowment’s book series on ‘Economic and Social 
History of the First World War’ in which Salter’s study had appeared. That series was 
important for the formation of his thought: ‘As I worked through the various 
manuscripts one particular background picture began to assert itself: it showed how 
under the impact of the new kind of warfare, which had made economic resources 
and industrial potential a decisive factor, the belligerents had all adopted much the 
same ways and means for dealing with problems of supply and production and 
distribution under conditions of war’ (ibid.). The form of governance followed from its 
specific function and manifested itself cross-nationally.  
 
Mitrany’s 1933 book on international government is the first book-length treatise on 
what came to be called later ‘IR functionalism’. It originated from a series of lectures 
delivered at Yale University. In the first lecture Mitrany attacks the categorical 
distinction between the domestic and the international that had become so 
fashionable in international affairs. ‘It is my general thesis, which I shall endeavour to 
expound in a pragmatic manner, that the crisis through which our institutions of 
government are passing springs precisely from that divorce between the two fields of 
municipal and international political theory and practice’ (Mitrany 1933: 20). Mitrany 
develops here a most important theme of his work: that modernization required 
overcoming the territorial fragmentation of the political world. He does not, however, 
start immediately with practical considerations but seeks to ground his approach 
historically and philosophically. His starting point is the idea of equality that was   21 
applied since the Enlightenment to both individuals and states. Historically, he claims, 
the equality of states that emerged under the Westphalian order had come to stand 
in the way of progress and modernization (Mitrany 1933: 33).  
 
While economic and social progress unfolded domestically, politics in the 
international realm was devoted to the avoidance of armed conflict through balance 
of power politics and an orientation towards the status quo. This is why the 
opportunities for transnational modernization through cooperative efforts have been 
missed at the international scale. The doctrine of sovereignty stood in the way of 
setting up institutions that really served the international common good as it 
legitimated politics of national grandeur and mundane rent-seeking. What put 
pressure on this traditional system of international politics was the increasing level of 
transnational societal interaction – what today we might call a wave of globalization. 
During the 19
th century, Mitrany explains, states were forced to conclude international 
treaties and conventions to deal with problems arising from interdependence. But 
they did so only in those fields where these tasks where of technical rather than 
political character. ‘In such timid and groping manner, more forced than willing, the 
nineteenth century acquired a sense of the unity of international interests. That 
psychological advance was perhaps the most important discovery of the last hundred 
years’ (Mitrany 1933: 44/45). Mitrany places much emphasis on this changing 
perception that for him is the foundation for the belated modernization of international 
life and a setting-up of appropriate ‘machinery’. He displays a good deal of optimism 
and of faith in the prospect of international cooperation.  
 
The new and better system of ‘international government’ that Mitrany seeks to 
propose is built upon the notion of equality, but without the excesses of   22 
unaccountable power that the anarchical international system based on sovereignty 
has given rise to. That system in the end came to violate equality by privileging great 
powers and excluding minor powers from decision-making. Real equality, he 
contends by citing his teacher Hobhouse, requires the rule of law, and Mitrany 
asserts that this is true domestically and internationally (1933: 65). International law 
must be developed and its implementation overseen by international executive 
bodies and courts in order to end the arbitrariness of great power conduct. In this 
respect, he finds encouragement in the contemporary developments in the discipline 
of law where ideas of a universal legal order assailed the doctrine of national 
sovereignty. He also felt encouraged by the working of the mandates system and 
protection of national minorities by the League that are ‘eating into the fabric of the 
national sovereign State’ (1933: 79).  
 
Not surprisingly, given his interest in the social question, Mitrany also discusses 
social inequality among nations as an aspect of international concern. Social equality 
shall be created by international cooperation in the field of economic development, 
health, education etc. Mitrany finds these functions still in an embryonic state but 
flags them as promising tasks for future international cooperation. Compared to other 
IR theorists, Mitrany had a rather unusual conception of equality, encompassing 
social aspects. State equality for him does not have any value in and of itself but only 
with a view to the individuals living within the respective territories. Mitrany’s 
theoretical approach is radically different from realist views on world politics in that he 
starts theorizing international relations from the individual. ‘[T]he State is for the 
people and not the people for the State’ (1933: 99). The basis of his theorizing are 
the needs of human beings that are fulfilled through the functions of societal 
institutions. Meeting the needs was not tied to any particular state nor was it tied to   23 
any specific cultural group or nation. ‘Need, to Mitrany as to all liberal 
internationalists, was something that cut across cultural barriers’ (Ashworth 1999: 
95).  
 
For Mitrany, there is no good reason to assume that the state should be privileged in 
performing these functions. Unlike contemporary IR-liberals, such as Keohane and 
Moravcsik, who accept the existence and predict the persistence of the nation-state, 
Mitrany’s functionalism is definitely anti-statist in character (Hammarlund 2005). 
Mitrany wanted to overcome the nation-state that he saw as a breeding ground of 
chauvinist sentiment, and irrationality. Nationalism was the ultimate cause of most 
political evil. ‘A new philosophy for a world society must indeed begin by striking at 
the roots of this perverse creed. The first duty it must enjoin is that we should 
renounce the pagan worship of political frontiers as the source of our public law and 
morals’ (Mitrany 1933: 118). There was, for Mitrany, no justification of the state 
beyond the functions that it served and at some point in history had come to 
monopolize and bundle. Meeting the needs of individuals was the basis for a 
genuinely de-nationalized type of governance.  
 
It is here that we can discern the intimate connection between welfare and 
international affairs that seems to be characteristic of British idealism of the interwar 
years. Mitrany observed that the state was taking on more and more tasks in meeting 
the needs of its citizens, hence becoming a ‘service State’ (1933: 93). In Europe and 
North America, the state apparatus in fact expanded rapidly between the wars.
3
                                                 
3 There is a certain paradox in Mitrany’s thought that Hammarlund (2005) has pointed out most clearly. Mitrany 
witnessed the expansion and strengthening of the state while predicting its decline. 
 The 
state in practice provided its services mainly through centralized planning and 
control, and bureaucratic organization. Yet national planning was bound to fail   24 
without appropriate international coordination, especially when one tried to plan 
scientifically. Due to the manifold interdependencies, the national plans of states 
would interfere with and disturb each other. In planning in the domestic context ‘it has 
been found fairly easy to separate the political from the technical aspect’ (1933: 122), 
Mitrany claims, and he singled out this type of governance as the way forward.
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With respect to international organizations, their most fundamental functions are 
essentially two: creating equality before the law and creating ‘fair material conditions’ 
(1933: 103). Yet of course the problems they deal with in practice are more humble 
and specific. The nature of the task determines the type and geographical scope of 
the organization. Already in his “Progress of International Government” Mitrany 
argues against a reproduction of supranational state-like structures, shunning away 
from any type of territorially bounded re-organization of politics. He advocates instead 
a purely functional form of governance beyond the nation-state as a web of 
organizations of different membership and geographical reach. 
 
In summary, there are some interesting parallels between Salter’s and Mitrany’s 
account. Mitrany’s account certainly is more systematic and more comprehensive 
than Salter’s statement. However, Salter’s focus on problem-solving as task of 
international governance is equally prominent in Mitrany’s early work. The creation of 
functionally defined spheres of international governance is a key point in Mitrany, as 
is the paramount role of experts and expertise. And his faith in the benefits of public 
planning is as unshakable as Salter’s. However, there are elements in Mitrany’s 
account of functional governance that cannot be found in ‘Allied Shipping Control’. 
                                                 
4 Mitrany was confident that ‘(…) functional arrangements have the virtue of technical self-determination, one of 
the main reasons which makes them more readily acceptable. The nature of each function tells of itself the scope 
and powers needed for its effective performance’ (Mitrany 1948: 358).   25 
First is Mitrany’s staunch anti-nationalism and his conviction that the state needed to 
be overcome as form of social organisation at some point. This lead him to part from 
Salter and to develop the proposal for more powerful supranational organizations, 
and not for the kind of intergovernmental cooperation that Salter favoured. In 
addition, there is the keen interest in the social question and a preoccupation with 
questions of equality that is prominent in Mitrany but absent from Salter, who was 
politically more conservative. Interestingly, the textbook wisdom that the overriding 
concern of IR functionalism was to overcome war through functional cooperation is 
not really confirmed by Mitrany’s “System of International Government”, where it is 
only a secondary theme. It was only in his “Working Peace System” (Mitrany 1943, 
1966) that Mitrany put it centre stage. 
 
b) American functionalism 
Among the authors who are typically listed as classic IR functionalists (Haas 
2008[1964]: 29), Paul S. Reinsch and Pitman B. Potter are the only Americans. This 
makes their work particularly interesting for this exploratory study. They developed 
their ideas far away from the circles of British internationalism. But to what extent is 
their resulting vision of international technocracy different from the ideas formulated 
by Salter and Mitrany? Paul S. Reinsch (1869-1923) was a political scientist at the 
University of Wisconsin and one of the first students of international organizations. 
He also served as US diplomat for many years, mainly in Asia, where he died on a 
mission in 1923. Reinsch is still cited in the legal literature as one of the founding 
fathers of the law of international organizations whose pioneering contribution is 
about to be re-discovered (Klabbers 2010). His major publications on international 
functional organizations are two substantial articles (Reinsch 1907, 1909) and a   26 
rather slim monograph, in which much of the material from those articles is re-
assembled (Reinsch 1911).  
 
Reinsch in his works makes a very clear case for the international organization of an 
interdependent world (Reinsch 1911: 3). He adopts a theoretical point of view that he 
calls ‘humanitarian’ and allocates to a liberal tradition of thought that he traces back 
to Grotius, Locke and other ‘believers in a rationalist policy’ (Reinsch 1911: 8). His 
point of departure is quite similar to those of Salter and Mitrany in that he relates the 
welfare of citizens clearly to the need for international action. The main task of 
international cooperation, in his view, is to secure advantages for citizens through 
contact with other nations. ‘Relying merely upon the capacities and resources 
contained within its national territory, it can not offer to those dependent upon it the 
protection and the advantages which as citizens of the modern world they have a 
right to demand’ (Reinsch 1909: 12). The means for delivering such advantages is 
functional cooperation in the framework of the ‘Public Unions’, a name widely used 
for functional international organizations at his time. ‘Civilized nations, being desirous 
to arrange their affairs in the most scientific and effective fashion, feel the need of 
making use of experience and knowledge wherever it may be found’ (Reinsch 1907: 
581). 
 
Public unions with limited tasks, as Reinsch points out, had cropped up more or less 
spontaneously since the 19
th century, without any global plan or orchestration. In his 
survey of more than thirty unions existing in his day he concludes that elements of all 
classic functions of government, the legislative, the executive, and the judicial, can be 
detected in these organizations, even if sometimes in an embryonic state (Reinsch 
1909). His emphasis, however, is on the complexity of the technical tasks of   27 
international governance that requires expert advisors and expert diplomats. These 
experts are often in conflict with more traditionally minded diplomats who treat 
questions according to the pursuit of national interest, prestige and considerations of 
power. Traditional diplomacy, in his view, was one of the retarding elements that 
inhibited the growth of international administration. This made him state that 
international functional organization was feasible only where nations perceived a 
harmony of interest. 
 
In a truly modernist spirit, Reinsch underlines that international administration will 
lead to uniformity, less through imposing standards, but by mutual learning and 
spread of best practices. He displays a strong faith in the possibility of experts 
determining universally best solutions to technical questions. International 
organizations fulfilled a function as dispensers of factual information, but also of 
knowledge about administrative routines and practices, that national administration 
would otherwise not have access to. He suggested that international functional 
cooperation would lead to harmonization of public administration and to a ‘uniformity 
of law’ (Reinsch 1909: 44). The power resource of these international administrations 
he found to be in the ‘reason and practicalness of the ideas suggested, which may 
ultimately bring about unanimity among all the nations concerned’ (Reinsch 1909: 
29).  
 
Unlike Mitrany, Paul Reinsch did not expect the state to become redundant as a 
consequence of political and administrative internationalization, nor did he want it to 
disappear. For Reinsch, states were crucial in creating the much needed international 
administrative capacities (Reinsch 1909: 17). He rather imagined a sort of interplay 
between the international and national level of public administration. ‘The effect   28 
which international organization has exercised upon the methods and processes of 
national administration has been salutary. In the international conventions and 
congresses, methods are compared, criticisms and suggestions are made, and the 
best experience of the world is centralized; all of which may be turned to advantage 
by progressive national administrations’ (Reinsch 1909: 16) However, the advantage 
of functional cooperation for Reinsch was not only in the welfare gains resulting from 
smooth administration and expert governance. In his work we also find the argument, 
often attributed to functionalism, that international interdependence and international 
cooperative endeavours will lead to international solidarity, and eventually peace. 
War between nations, he contended, would become less and less likely as the web of 
interdependence between nations grew thicker (Reinsch 1909: 18).  
 
Like Paul S. Reinsch, Pitman B. Potter (1892-1981) served as professor at the 
University of Wisconsin before moving on to the newly established Graduate Institute 
for International Studies in Geneva, where he stayed from 1932 to 1941. In contrast 
to the other three early functionalists studied here he never worked outside 
academia. Potter was a prolific writer. His opus magnum is an ‘Introduction to the 
Study of International Organization’, first published in 1922 and repeatedly re-edited 
until the 1950s. In the US, Potter was one of the leading figures of the study of 
international organizations during that period. His writing style was much more 
scholarly than Salter’s and Mitrany’s, and he was somewhat more scrupulous and 
less programmatic in his proposals. Yet there are good reasons why Potter may be 
regarded as a programmatic IR functionalist.  
 
He developed his account of international technocracy before the background of a 
deep-felt dissatisfaction with the achievements of traditional diplomacy. First of all, he   29 
argued, diplomacy was deficient as it only dealt with issues of transnational 
importance only when disputes among states arose (Potter 1922: 269-70). In order to 
improve on this practice, international organizations with administrative functions, 
which he calls bureaus, should work on these issues continually. ‘The bureaus have, 
in the past, been created to meet certain needs and have been given duties 
according to the need in each case, and a form calculated to support the functions 
assigned to these organizations’ (Potter 1922: 275). For Potter, organizational form 
follows function. He also sustains a division between the political and the technical 
but argues that the difference between the two is not to be found in the subject 
matter that the organizations are concerned with. All political questions have 
technical aspects, and technical questions have political implications (Potter 1922: 
283). It is not the subject matter that makes the difference but the method of tackling 
these subjects. ‘It is the distinction between the volitional and the scientific attitude 
and action upon any given matter’ (Potter 1935: 268). 
 
Which subjects are being treated scientifically by international bureaus is in the end a 
question of political will, as states retain the prerogative of deciding this. The fact that 
mainly non-contentious, low politics issues are treated internationally is a 
consequence of the lack of political resolve to cede control over more contentious 
ones, not a direct consequence of issue characteristics. However, once a subject has 
been transferred to an international administration even a contentious question will 
be gradually removed from diplomatic strife and power politics. Potter quite openly 
prefers the scientific over the political, or ‘volitional’ method, and in this he seems to 
be in perfect agreement with Salter, Mitrany, and Reinsch. States are irrational in 
their reluctance to transfer issues to international organizations. In a rather short-
sighted fashion they fear a loss of freedom to exploit opportunities of rent-seeking   30 
that might arise in diplomatic negotiations. But this will prevent outcomes conducive 
to the  common good, and to the welfare of all. ‘If once a Convention can be 
concluded and a subject referred to a bureau and kept there, there is some prospect 
that it will be dealt with on its merits and not by reference to what are often fictitious 
and artificial ‘national policies’’ (Potter 1922: 283).  
 
Like Reinsch, Potter does not see the state, or national government, on the retreat, or 
as being marginalized by international interdependence and functional necessities. 
Yet in his writings there is a discernable contempt of the ‘volitional’ method of dealing 
with problems that would be much better solved in a scientific fashion. The call for 
treating political issues ‘on their merits’ is a theme that runs through Potter’s work 
and is even more prominent than in Salter and Mitrany. Potter shares their 
confidence in rationalization of international conduct and the welfare gains to be 
obtained from international organization. In a later edition of his “Introduction”, Potter 
comes to draw a sharp dividing line between the realm of international politics, as 
traditionally conceived, and the new world of international organization that consists, 
essentially, of the combination of an international rule of law and international 
administration.  
 
‘More and more matters of international rivalry are being given treatment in some 
more mature and formal manner. Institutions and forms of procedure in international 
cooperation are engulfing one after another of the great topics of international politics 
and reducing the importance of one after another area of international conflict. One 
item after another in the foreign policy programs of various nations is being 
transferred to the agenda of an international conference or the list of functions of an 
international commission. International politics tend to become obsolete, as   31 
international law and organized international cooperation become broader, deeper, 
and more effective’ (Potter 1948: 55).  
 
The ‘peace through functional cooperation’ theme is present in Potter’s work, but it is 
not as central as one might expect when bearing in mind the standard textbook 
account of IR functionalism. For Potter, functional international organization 
contributes to international stability in an indirect way, by tackling the economic and 
social causes of international conflict (Potter and West 1927: 186). The direct road to 
peace, however, runs through conference diplomacy, international arbitration and fair 
peace treaties. Functional international organization, in contrast, is the road to global 
welfare. 
 
5) Key themes and legacy 
If we compare the legitimating motives proposed by the authors in their accounts of 
what one may call an international technocracy we see a lot of overlap, albeit they 
put their emphasis differently. Salter was most interested in the role of public 
administration, of expert committees and expert communication, and so was 
Reinsch. Mitrany was particularly concerned with planning, and tailoring institutional 
arrangements to functional needs and with the disempowerment of the nation state. 
Potter, by contrast, underlined the importance of the law as a civilizer of nations, and 
as institutional precondition for functional governance to be successful. It should also 
be highlighted that the starting points of their arguments are markedly different. Salter 
came to develop a vision of international technocracy from his personal experience 
as a participant in international cooperation. Mitrany’s account has a more 
philosophical grounding in British left-wing liberalism that stands in the tradition of 
Hobhouse and, ultimately, T.H. Green. The two American writers, on the other hand,   32 
start from a position that one may describe as a form of pragmatic, liberal, but 
essentially un-ideological cosmopolitanism. 
 
What they all have in common, however, is a view on international politics from the 
perspective of the individual and its needs. The four authors discussed here were all 
convinced that international interdependence had created a pressing need for 
international political cooperation. The ultimate goal of functional cooperation is 
welfare, conceptualized from the perspective of the individual, and not from the 
perspective of a rent-seeking state. In that sense, functionalism clearly is a 
cosmopolitan theory. International governance should unfold in organizations with 
clearly and narrowly defined tasks. The quality of governance is secured by 
employing experts who are able to discuss problems ‘on their merits’. This was 
clearly contrasted with a notion of international politics as irrational, driven by short-
sighted calculations of power and national prestige. The legitimating narrative of 
international functional cooperation is about overcoming the traditional tragedies of 
international politics and diplomacy by shifting tasks to technical and legal experts. 
This is the road to progress and, not least, international peace. We can thus identify 
four central motives of an (early) legitimating account of international organizations 
that poses the emphasis clearly on the output of governance arrangements:  
 
1) International organizations serve the common good of the world’s citizens, not the 
particular interests of states. 
 
2) International organizations can resolve transnational problems that affect the 
constituencies within their geographical reach. 
   33 
3) International organizations secure the quality of their governance through the 
paramount role of experts and a mode of communication that enables them to find 
the best solutions to these problems. 
 
4) In international organizations, the rule of law shields experts and administrators 
from the irrationalities of power politics and the ruthless pursuit of national interests. 
 
The vision of governance proposed here draws on the legitimating virtues of science 
and law in mobilizing support for handing tasks over to an international bureaucracy. 
With its great faith in science, technology and planning it clearly is a modernist 
account that was equally popular in proposals for domestic reform during the same 
period (Murphy 1999, Pemberton 2001, Chapter  4). Although most popular after 
World War II, functionalism in IR clearly is a child of the 1920s. There are some 
striking parallels here with key themes from Max Weber’s theory of modernization, 
centring on technological progress, the rule of law and the rise of expert bureaucracy. 
Although none of the authors discussed here draws heavily on Weber’s writings the 
mode of legitimation proposed by them for international governance is ‘rational-legal’ 
in an almost ideal-typical form (Weber 1978: 217/8).  
 
I have argued in the beginning that in this essay functionalism would not be 
discussed, or at least not primarily, as an academic theory of international relations 
(as has been the case in much of the extant literature on the subject) but as a 
legitimating account advanced to call for and justify a certain type of international 
cooperation. My view is not from inside the universe of IR theory but from the outside. 
I have also insinuated that this legitimating account was influential. Although I cannot 
draw on a rigorous study measuring the influence of that doctrine, scholars have   34 
delivered evidence that it took deep roots in the minds of practitioners. Already in the 
League of Nations negotiations, proposals for a functional design of the organization 
were prominent, especially on the British side (Wilson 1995b: 138). In subsequent 
years, high-ranking League officials pushed functionalist ideas and policy proposals 
in Geneva, prominently among them Salter and Monnet (Ghébali 1975: 147). Also 
the first Secretary General of the League, Sir Eric Drummond, promoted functional 
forms of cooperation in the organization; and that Jean Monnet came to propose 
European integration along functional lines after World War II does not need further 
explanation. 
 
As legitimation of international governance, functionalist theorizing to some degree 
seems to have created the conditions for its own reproduction in international 
institutions. As a legitimating strategy it became, in a way, taken for granted. 
Elements of functionalist theorizing were frequently reflected in the speeches and 
writings of international civil servants (Taylor and Groom 1975: 1); and academics 
doing their field work in international organizations found what they believed to be 
their own jargon tossed at them by the subjects of their study (Schmitter 1970: 838). 
And until the 1980s, at least, ‘lawyers and others working in or with international 
organizations have all been speaking the language of functionalism without realizing 
it’ (Klabbers 2010: 4). This taken for granted-ness of the functionalist account 
indicates that at least among elites, but plausibly also to many other people, the 
output-oriented legitimation of international governance was for a long time 
convincing and almost self-evident. 
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6) Conclusion 
The purpose of this essay was to inquire into the history of output-oriented 
legitimation of international governance. The search for the origins of a legitimating 
account centring on the output of governance led us to an early body of thought that 
one would label, from today’s perspective, a functionalist approach to international 
organization. In the IR-theory debate, this functionalism and the derivative ‘neo-
functionalism’ received a fair share of beating for shortcomings in their ability to 
explain and predict the course of international politics and regional integration. Yet, 
for authors such as Salter, Mitrany, Reinsch and Potter, academic explanation or 
prediction was not the main point. They strove to deliver an appealing blueprint for 
politically promoting functional international cooperation, and hence a convincing 
legitimating account. Consequently, the key question asked in this essay was not if 
functionalist theories were correct in their predictions about international cooperation 
and regional integration. What was at the centre here was the emergence of a 
legitimating account that served to justify the transfer of competence and decision-
making power to inter- or supranational technocracies. This is, I contend, the most 
important legacy of functionalism. 
 
Comparing the works of Salter, Mitrany, Reinsch and Potter as eminent early 
functionalist writers I sketched the contours of this particular strand of internationalist 
thought that took up existing ideas of peace through interdependence and 
international cooperation and gave it a particular twist. Although the four authors 
under study here had quite different intellectual backgrounds that informed their 
functionalist theorizing, their accounts nevertheless converged on a remarkable 
number  of key themes. For all of them, the promise of functional international 
cooperation was to rationalize political conduct in international relations and to treat   36 
political questions ‘on their merits’. Only this mode of operation can guarantee good, 
in the sense of welfare-enhancing, results that serve the public good. This is the 
essence of output legitimacy as originally defined by Scharpf.  
 
In the functionalist account, global welfare is the goal, and international technocracy 
the way to reach it. For this to happen, international relations need to be depoliticized 
through the rule of law. Cooperation under the rule of law secures a fair treatment to 
every case and rolls back the effects of power asymmetries. The law thus provides 
an environment that makes sure that substantive considerations will prevail over the 
rent-seeking of states. The expertise of technocrats is conducive to the quality of 
political results as it guarantees that the persons in charge of choosing from different 
options have the necessary expertise to do so. The reign of expertise, shielded by 
the law against political interference, reassures us that the most appropriate option 
will be chosen in the end. Functional cooperation brings reason to bear in world 
politics, instead of power and short-sighted economic self-interest.  
 
The particular promise of functionalism hence was to institutionalize a specific way of 
policy-making based on scientific evidence and expertise, purified of the pushing and 
shoving of everyday politics. In Weber’s terminology, international governance of this 
kind would be based on purely rational-legal legitimacy. Of course, from today’s 
perspective the enthusiasm of the early functionalists about science as political 
advisor and neutral arbiter seems excessive. Technocracy has come to be seen by 
many as a veritable threat to democracy, and a rather subtle and hidden way of 
exerting power and control over society. This essay is not the right place to discuss 
the faults and merits of technocracy. However, I contend that the timeless appeal of 
functionalist motives in a legitimating account of international cooperation is rooted   37 
precisely in its modernist vision of governance, which was contrasted effectively with 
the frustrating irrationalities of international politics Westphalian style. Functionalists 
were able to present an attractive vision of international governance that found 
staunch supporters and with its rationalist, modernist overtones inspired generations 
of academic thinkers, civil servants and policy-makers.  
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